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Abstract
Background: There has been a rapid spread of  Ebola Viral Hemorrhagic disease in Guinea, Liberia and Sierra 
Leone since March 2014. Since this is the first time of  a major Ebola outbreak in West Africa; it is possible there 
is lack of  understanding of  the epidemic in the communities, lack of  experience among the health workers to 
manage the cases and limited capacities for rapid response.  The main objective of  this article is to share Uganda’s 
experience in controlling similar Ebola outbreaks and to suggest some lessons that could inform the control of  
the Ebola outbreak in West Africa. 
Methods: The article is based on published papers, reports of  previous Ebola outbreaks, response plans and ex-
periences of  individuals who have participated in the control of  Ebola epidemics in Uganda.
Lessons learnt:  The success in the control of  Ebola epidemics in Uganda has been due to high political support, 
effective coordination through national and district task forces. In addition there has been active surveillance, 
strong community mobilization using village health teams and other community resources persons, an efficient 
laboratory system that has capacity to provide timely results. These have coupled with effective case management 
and infection control and the involvement of  development partners who commit resources with shared respon-
sibility.
Conclusion: Several factors have contributed to the successful quick containment of  Ebola outbreaks in Uganda. 
West African countries experiencing Ebola outbreaks could draw some lessons from the Uganda experience and 
adapt them to contain the Ebola epidemic. 
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Background 
On 23th March, 2014, the Ministry of  Health of  Guin-
ea notified the World Health Organisation of  the out-
break of  Ebola Virus Disease1. The cases of  Ebola 
were initially reported from three southeastern districts 
of  Gueckedou, Macenta, Nzerekore, and Kissidougou 
in the forest region; and in Conakry, the capital city. The 
tests on the samples taken from suspected patients were 
positive for Ebola Zaire, thus confirming the first Ebola 
outbreak in Guinea1. 
 retrospective epidemiologic investigation indicated that 
the first suspect case in the outbreak2 was a 2-year-old 
child from Meliandou, Gueckedou that died on 6 De-
cember 2013.   Between December 2013 and March 
2014, the outbreak spread from Gueckedou, to Ma-
centa, Kissidougou, and Conakry, the capital city2, 3. 
The Ebola outbreak then spread to the neighbouring 
countries of  Liberia and Sierra Leone. The Ministry of  
Health and Social Welfare of  Liberia formally declared 
Ebola outbreak on 29th March, 2014 while Sierra Leone 
notified the first case of  Ebola to the WHO on 25 May, 
2014 4,5. As of  17th July, 2014, the cumulative number 
of  cases attributed to Ebola in the three countries was 
1,048 and 632 deaths (Case Fatality Rate of  60%) 6. 
The transmission of  Ebola in W. Africa has been char-
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acterized by the following four major patterns: 6
•Transmission dominantly in the rural communities
•Transmission mainly in the densely populated peri-
urban cities of  Conakry and Monrovia
•Transmission along the shared border areas of  Guinea, 
Liberia and Sierra Leone.
•Persistent transmission in health care settings with sev-
eral health workers contacting and dying from Ebola 
virus disease. 
In this paper, we share Uganda’s experiences in con-
trolling similar Ebola outbreaks, and suggest some best 
practices that could inform the control of  the Ebola 
outbreak in West Africa, and perhaps address the differ-
ent challenges being faced in its containment. 
Methods: 
The article is based on review of  published papers and 
updates on the Ebola outbreak in West-Africa, pub-
lished papers about the previous Viral Hemorrhagic 
Fever outbreaks in Uganda, reports of  previous Ebola 
outbreaks, response plans and experiences of  individu-
als who have participated in the control of  Ebola epi-
demics in Uganda. The authors were all actively involved 
in the response to Viral Hemorrhagic Fever outbreaks 
in Uganda.
The Major Challenges of  the Ebola Outbreak in 
W. Africa:
•There is lack of  understanding of  the epidemic in the 
communities (‘there is no such thing as Ebola” says 
the community), lack of  experience among the health 
workers to manage the cases and limited capacities for 
rapid response as this is the first Ebola outbreak in West 
Africa.  
•High exposure to the Ebola virus in the communities 
through household care and customary burial proce-
dures e.g. use bare hands to wash dead bodies. This has 
resulted into high number of  deaths in the communities 
leading to panic and anxiety. There are misconceptions 
on the new disease; and this has led to denials, mistrust, 
hostility to health workers especially foreign health 
workers and rejection of  public health interventions. 
There are beliefs and myths that impede acceptance of  
messages about treatment; for example communities 
believe hospitalization is a death sentence.
•The other challenge relates to the fact that by the 
time the outbreak was finally confirmed and declared 
in Guinea on 21 March 2014, several clusters of  cases, 
suspected to have started several months back were 
identified in hospitals in Gueckedou and Macenta 2, 
7. Due to the delayed detection of  Ebola virus disease 
in Guinea, transmission chains accumulated leading to 
increased number of  Ebola cases that were dispersed 
over wide geographical areas2, 7.  It therefore became 
an immense and complicated challenge to trace all these 
chains of  transmission dispersed over wide geographi-
cal locations by teams of  public health workers that 
have no previous experience in responding to Ebola 
virus disease outbreaks. 
•Emergency response relies a lot on the capacity of  the 
prevailing health systems before the disaster strikes. It 
is now well established that just like the other counties 
where Ebola has caused outbreaks in sub-Saharan Afri-
ca in the past, the three counties affected by the current 
Ebola outbreak in West Africa have  weak health sys-
tems with acute shortages of  the much needed human 
resources and lack of  in-country capacities to confirm 
Filoviruses such as  Ebola 7, 8. The delayed detection 
of  cases at the onset of  outbreaks is a major indicator 
of  the level of  functionality of  the health system and 
the corresponding surveillance systems for detecting 
priority diseases. 
•The persistent number of  deaths among health work-
ers shows that the three counties lacked preparedness 
for Ebola virus disease outbreaks. Consequently, the 
healthcare workers lacked training on infection control 
precautions including barrier nursing that are requisite 
for healthcare worker safety so that the much needed 
patient care is provided 8.  
•Current information from the outbreaks indicates that 
Ebola cases were either missed by active case finding 
teams or were actually withdrawn from the isolation fa-
cilities by relatives even after they were confirmed to have 
Ebola 8. This breach of  infection control and isolation 
recommendations can only worsen outbreak trends as it 
actually did in West Africa. It has been revealed that the 
decision by relatives to withdraw patients confirmed to 
have Ebola from the isolation facilities was prompted 
by the decision to transfer cases to distant hospitals 8. 
Transfer of  Ebola patients over long distances is never 
a good idea due to the risk of  spreading the outbreak 
to new locations and the risk of  losing the much-need-
ed cooperation of  the affected communities. The fact 
that response teams were eventually turned away from 
affected communities shows that this trust and confi-
dence had been breached. 
Uganda’s Experience in Controlling Ebola and 
Other Epidemics 
Over the last 15 years, Uganda has had several viral he-
morrhagic fever (VHF) outbreaks 9-21.  The first and 
biggest Ebola outbreak in Uganda occurred in 2000 
with cases being reported in the three districts of  Gulu, 
African Health Sciences Vol 14 Issue 3, September 2014 496
Masindi, and Mbarara 9. In the subsequent years, out-
breaks were reported in Bundibugyo, Luwero, Kibaale, 
and Luwero districts in 2007, 2011, 2012 and 2012 re-
spectively 10-13. Marburg virus disease outbreaks were 
also reported in Ibanda and Kamwenge in 2007; involv-
ing cases in the Netherlands and United States respec-
tively that were exposed after visiting caves in Bushenyi 
district; and in 2012 with cases confirmed in Ibanda and 
Kabale districts 13, 14. A major outbreak of  Yellow Fe-
ver was reported in five districts in Northern Uganda in 
2010 with 181 cases including 45 deaths being reported 
10. 
In virtually all the above, the disease outbreaks were 
controlled with limited spread of  the epidemics much 
beyond the initial loci of  the outbreak. In addition, the 
case fatality rates for Ebola were Gulu [52.7%]; Bun-
dibugyo [32%]; Luwero 2011 [(1/1) -100%]; Kibaale 
[70.8%]; and Luwero  [57.1%] 15. 
Thus Uganda has accumulated enough experience that 
can be shared with other countries that face the risk 
of  these epidemics. Specifically, the following strategies 
were used:
•Uganda has standing multi-sectoral and multidiscipli-
nary task force committees on epidemics that include 
partners and NGOs at the national and district level. 
The national task force is composed of  experts (epi-
demiologists, laboratory scientists, communication ex-
perts, psychiatrists and psychologists, physicians, veteri-
narians, etc.) from the Ministry of  Health, Ministry of  
Agriculture, Office of  the Prime Minister and partners 
including WHO, CDC, UNICEF, AFENET, Uganda 
Red Cross, and MSF and it meets monthly; however it 
meets daily when there is an epidemic. 
Similarly, all the districts have task forces composed of  
the district political, civic, and health leadership as well 
as technical advisors from different partners working in 
the districts. Both the National and district task forces 
have subcommittees that are responsible for overseeing 
and implementing different components of  epidemic 
response; the subcommittees include coordination, 
epidemiology and laboratory, case management, social 
mobilization, logistics, and psychosocial support and all 
have clear terms of  reference. In addition, national rap-
id response teams and district rapid response teams are 
constituted immediately an epidemic is notified. They 
conduct investigations and support the establishment 
of  an appropriate response in collaboration with the 
task forces. To reinforce response coordination at the 
district level, two or three senior officers are deployed 
from the national level to the district level to work with 
the district task force. There is daily contact between the 
district and national task forces during epidemic time. 
The Ministers of  Health and other senior officers in the 
ministry of  health and WHO visit the affected areas to 
explain the government actions, seek the community’s 
cooperation, and motivate the response teams.
During the inter-epidemic periods, monthly taskforce 
meetings are convened to review disease surveillance 
data and update epidemic preparedness and response 
plans. There is constant communication between dis-
trict surveillance officers and the national level espe-
cially the division of  disease surveillance in the ministry 
of  health. 
•Uganda was one of  the first countries in WHO-AFRO 
to adopt the integrated disease surveillance and response 
strategy (IDSR) in 2000. Over the years, the national 
surveillance system has been strengthened based on 
this strategy. The designated surveillance focal points 
at health sub-district, district, and regional levels, have 
been trained and facilitated to ensure timely detection, 
reporting, and investigation of  priority diseases.  These 
have been linked to the HMIS system for reporting of  
public health events of  national and/or international 
concern. The village health teams (VHTs) upon hear-
ing or detecting any reportable priority disease report 
to the nearest health facility. These are important links 
between the facility-based surveillance system and the 
community.  The surveillance system is further en-
hanced during epidemics to enable daily tracing of  all 
contacts of  viral hemorrhagic fever patients and im-
mediate investigation and isolation of  suspected cases. 
This ensures that transmission within the community is 
controlled quickly. Uganda has recently established an 
emergency operations centre supported by CDC and 
this provides timely data and maps of  epidemics.
•Uganda has overtime built a good laboratory network 
within districts, regional referral hospitals and at the 
national level. The samples for detection of  Ebola are 
analyzed in Entebbe at the Uganda Virus Research In-
stitute (UVRI). Uganda has also built capacity in speci-
men collection, processing, packaging and storage and 
an efficient specimen shipment mechanism. 
•Uganda has developed local capacity for social mobili-
zation during epidemics. We engage the political, local, 
opinion and religious eaders through meetings, radio 
messages and community meetings. Effort is made to 
first understand the knowledge, attitudes and beliefs of  
the affected people and this informs the social mobiliza-
tion efforts.  We work with partners including UNICEF 
and The Uganda Red Cross in this endeavor.
•Uganda has developed local experience in case 
management, infection prevention and control (IPC). 
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We have trained many health workers on Viral Haemor-
rhagic Fevers (VHF) case management and other epi-
demics over the years. We have training guidelines that 
have been updated over time. The health workers are 
deployed to manage cases in collaboration with part-
ners like MSF during the epidemics. Isolation facilities 
are set up in health facilities close to the affected areas 
to minimize transfer of  the patients for long distances. 
A list of  the trained and experienced health workers 
and their contacts is maintained at national level for 
quick contact when the health workers are needed in 
districts outside their usual work place. 
•During the VHF epidemics psychosocial support to 
affected patients, their attendants, and communities 
has been adopted as a practice. A team of  psychosocial 
support providers engages the affected communities to 
understand their misconceptions and misgivings, takes 
time to address them and discuss socially accepted so-
lutions which are then adopted by the response team. 
The psychosocial team also counsels the patients and 
their immediate family about the natural progression of  
the disease and the expected outcomes; and keeps the 
immediate family briefed on the situation of  the pa-
tient in isolation facility. In addition, the team provides 
psychosocial support to the health workers working in 
isolation facility to avoid burnout and depression.
•To further prevent transmission within the affected 
communities, the affected homes are disinfected and 
the contaminated personal effects of  the patients disin-
fected and destroyed. The personal effects the patients 
come with to isolation facility are also disinfected and 
destroyed at discharge. To replace the destroyed person-
al effects, a “discharge package” is given to the patient 
on discharge and the family of  the deceased patients. 
This enhances cooperation of  the families with sick pa-
tients that need to be taken to the isolation facility. 
•Close supervision of  the response by the National Task 
Force, the top leadership of  the Ministry of  Health, and 
the top Government leadership. 
•Uganda has been working with neighboring countries 
to strengthen the cross-border surveillance and man-
agement of  epidemics. This should be strengthened 
among the W. African countries 
Challenges Uganda has Met in Controlling Ebola Viral 
Hemorrhagic Disease
•The delayed detection of  viral hemorrhagic fever out-
breaks as we have seen in the West African Ebola out-
break has been a challenge in most of  the Ebola out-
breaks in Uganda. This challenge is attributed to the 
non-specific presentation of  cases at the onset of  Ebo-
la virus disease outbreaks. To improve the detection of  
these atypical disease outbreaks the Uganda Ministry of  
Health has initiated the following interventions: Stand-
ardized clinical and community case definitions for all 
priority diseases including mysterious cases/deaths have 
been developed and disseminated to all health facilities 
and VHTs. In addition, village health teams (VHTs) 
have been trained on using the community case defini-
tions to detect and report emerging disease outbreaks 
or mysterious diseases to the nearest health facilities 
for further verification. Also, as part of  the nationwide 
drive by the Ministry of  Health to strengthen the na-
tional disease surveillance system, district health teams 
and rapid response teams are being trained to enhance 
the implementation of  the integrated disease surveil-
lance and response strategy at all levels. 
•Before the Ebola outbreak in Bundibugyo in 2007, 
Uganda lacked in-country capacities for laboratory con-
firmation of  Ebola and other Filoviruses. This led to 
major delays of  up to four weeks in securing labora-
tory confirmation. With support from the Centres for 
Disease Control and Prevention, a P3+ laboratory has 
been established at the UVRI and this has reduced the 
turnaround time to less than 24 hours. This has there-
fore been a major boost for response and case manage-
ment teams to rollout timely outbreak response inter-
ventions following the confirmation of  new Filovirus 
outbreaks.  
•Dealing with Ebola cases that are dispersed over a wide 
geographic expanse is never an easy undertaking. One 
strategy that has worked for Uganda is to have a decen-
tralized response with outbreak coordination commit-
tees formed in the respective districts that are affected 
by the outbreak. In addition, the decentralized district 
outbreak response teams have onsite support from sen-
ior technical officers from the national taskforce with 
experience in managing all the technical interventions 
for containing an Ebola outbreak. There is also remote 
support for the district outbreak response teams from 
the national taskforce through regular telephone con-
ference calls, sharing of  situation reports, and sharing 
minutes of  the taskforce meetings. 
•The need for strong and effective health systems is 
paramount for effective disease outbreak response. 
The need for adequate numbers of  well-trained health 
care workers with adequate medicines, infection control 
supplies, infrastructure, and equipment for case referral 
and isolation is paramount. Thus Uganda has developed 
a roster of  well-trained health workers with experience 
in managing Filovirus disease cases. These experts have 
been deployed to support response to Ebola outbreaks 
in Uganda and to all the three countries that are cur-
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rently affected by Ebola in West Africa. Additionally, 
the Uganda government has embarked on a phased 
plan of  setting up isolation facilities at all major hospi-
tals. During the first phase of  this program, a state-of-
the-art isolation facility has been built in Entebbe with 
support from the World Bank. To enhance capacities 
for case detection and management of  events due to 
especially dangerous pathogens (EDPs) like Filoviruses, 
the Uganda Ministry of  Health with support from the 
Defense Threat Reduction Agency (DTRA) is conduct-
ing trainings for healthcare workers countrywide.   
• Involving local leaders is a crucial component 
of  ensuring community compliance to the recommend-
ed public health interventions for Ebola control. Thus 
district outbreak response teams are by default chaired 
by elected local leaders that have the full mandate of  
the affected communities. In addition, the Govern-
ment of  Uganda has rolled out a community network 
of  Village Health Team members (VHTs). The VHTs 
are community health workers that are selected by the 
community to support the implementation of  public 
health interventions at the community level. The VHTs 
have proved to be a vital resource for supporting out-
break response activities. During the past Ebola out-
breaks, VHTs have been used to conduct door-to-door 
active case search, contact tracing and follow-up, and 
house-to-house health education on Ebola prevention 
and control. Since VHTs work in the very communities 
that elected them, they are more accepted and hence 
mistrust and rejection of  response teams has not been 
reported during the recent Filovirus outbreaks in 
Uganda. 
•A unique challenge that we have not had to deal with in 
the past but which is an issue during the current Ebola 
outbreaks in West Africa is containing transmission in 
closely knit cross-border communities. The newly es-
tablished WHO centre for coordinating response to the 
outbreaks in the three countries should come up with a 
strategy for enhancing cross-border communications to 
facilitate follow-up of  contacts, case isolation, and edu-
cating communities on Ebola prevention and control
Uganda’s response to the Ebola outbreak in W. Africa
On 8th April, 2014, the Ministry of  Health through its 
Public Emergency Operations Centre informed the dis-
tricts on the progress of  the Ebola outbreak in West 
Africa and urged health workers to have a high index 
of  suspicion especially for travelers to and from West 
Africa. 
•The Ministry of  Health issued a public press release 
(4th July 2014) and advised the public on the necessary 
precautions.  All district task forces were alerted.
•The Ministry has instituted measures for screening and 
follow- up of  travelers from W. Africa at the Entebbe 
international airport.
•The National Task Force is operational; and The Rapid 
Response Teams (RRT) is on full alert and ready to take 
action when necessary. 
Lessons for West Africa
Based on the above experience from Uganda, successful 
containment of  VHF epidemics will depend on effec-
tive epidemic coordination at national and sub-national 
levels in the West-African affected countries. Functional 
national and sub-national epidemic management com-
mittees and response teams that sit daily (to coordinate, 
review challenges and come up with workable solutions) 
should be established and/or strengthened. In addition, 
the W. African countries should strengthen active sur-
veillance, involve local community health workers and 
volunteers in active surveillance and contact tracing to 
ensure that all suspected cases are detected timely and 
removed from the community. Local capacity for case 
management should be urgently built and case man-
agement centres established close to the epidemic hot 
spots to minimize on transportation of  Ebola patients 
for long distances. This strategy increases acceptability 
of  the community to bring patients to isolation facili-
ties. 
Opinion leaders from affected communities should be 
engaged to participate in mobilization of  their own peo-
ple to cooperate with the response teams. Psychosocial 
support should be urgently stepped up targeting the af-
fected communities and families as well as the patients. 
Ebola response activities should be adapted where nec-
essary to ensure they are more culturally acceptable for 
the affected communities without compromising on 
infection prevention and control. Specifically the fol-
lowing recommendations are made:
•Local leaders should take centre stage in directing the 
Ebola response at the local level, guided by the national 
and international experts that constitute the outbreak 
response committees. 
•Natives from the affected communities should be 
trained to conduct house-to-house case search, contact 
tracing and follow up, and house-to-house health edu-
cation on Ebola prevention and control. 
•Ebola cases should be managed in isolation facilities 
that are located within the affected communities. 
•Health systems should be strengthened through: es-
tablishing in-country capacities for laboratory confir-
mation of  Ebola; conducting preparedness trainings 
on detecting and managing EDPs like Filoviruses and 
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enhancing IDSR capacities at all levels; and establishing 
a community network of  community health workers. 
•Develop a strategy for enhancing cross-border com-
munications to facilitate follow-up of  contacts, case iso-
lation, and educating communities on Ebola prevention 
and control.
•All political, religious and cultural leaders should pass 
on messages on Ebola prevention and the need to report 
suspected cases.  Anthropologists and communication 
experts should be increased (a ratio of  1:50,000 popula-
tion). All feasible communication channels should be 
used.
•The affected countries should to vigorously focus on 
critical sources of  infection which include home-based 
care of  patients and burial of  affected patients. An am-
bulance system should collect suspected patients (to the 
designated isolation health facility) from the communi-
ty as soon as they are reported by community resource 
persons.  The national response team should train local 
burial teams who should burry victims. The house or 
rooms of  the dead should be thoroughly disinfected. 
All beddings, mattresses and clothes that were use by 
the dead should be burned. If  culturally needed, some 
family members, dressed in appropriate protective wear, 
should be allowed to participate in or view the prepa-
ration of  their deceased relatives for burial. Strong 
messages should be passed to the communities by the 
political leaders preferably by the Presidents, religious 
and cultural leaders on the dangers of  getting in con-
tact with patients suspected of  Ebola and participating 
in burial of  patients without the appropriate personal 
protective equipment.  
•The local administration entities should consider de-
velopment of  by-laws and tough punitive measures that 
deter the community members from hiding patients, 
where necessary.
Conclusion
Ebola epidemics have been experienced by several 
countries in Africa and Uganda has experienced several 
of  them. Several factors highlighted above have been 
key to the quick containment of  Ebola outbreaks in 
Uganda. West African countries currently experienc-
ing Ebola outbreaks should draw some lessons quickly 
from the Uganda experience and adapt and adopt them 
so as to contain the Ebola epidemic. The morbidity and 
mortality due to the outbreak could be minimized by 
adopting some of  the drivers of  success in the Ugan-
dan experience above. 
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